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IN RE GAULT

IN RE GAULT - SUPREME COURT FORMALIZES
JUVENILE COURT PROCEDURES
In juvenile court proceedings, juveniles have traditionally
been denied certain constitutional rights generally guaranteed
adults in criminal proceedings. Beginning with the first
juvenile court in Cook County, Illinois in 1899,1 a new philosophy of justice to the juvenile was created in the United
States-that the adolescent who broke the law should not
be viewed and treated as an adult offender, but rather dealt
with in the same manner as a wise and understanding parent
would deal with his wayward child. The child was to be
considered society's child rather than an enemy of society.
He was to be given understanding, guidance and protection.
This concept of parens patriae2 became the theoretical basis
for rejecting the traditional criminal proceeding and the
criminal law adversary procedure. Theoretically, if the
child belonged to society and was not the enemy of society,
then the interests of the state and the interests of the child
were not in conflict but coincided. Since the interests coincided, there was no need for the adversary adjudicatory procedure and the procedural safeguards inherent in it. This
philosophy has been incorporated into the case law of fortytwo states and into the statutes of the remaining eight 3 and
has been the basis for denying juveniles a wide range of
procedural safeguards guaranteed in criminal proceedings.
Although juvenile courts have not been established in all
fifty states, where established, they have been the subject
1 See Act of April 21, 1899, § 1, [18991 Ill. Laws 131 (repealed
1965; now ILL. STAT. ANN. tit 23, § 2001 (Supp. 1966)).
2 See Handler, The Juvenile Court and the Adversary System:
Problems of Function and Form, 1965 Wis. L. REV. 7, 12.
3 See Pee v. United States, 274 F.2d 556, 561 (D.C. Cir. 1959)
(Appendix "A"). See also Killian v. Burnham, 191 Okla.
248,130 P.2d 538 (1942); In re Powell, 6 Okla. Crim. 495, 120
P. 1022 (1912).
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of increasing controversy. Many authorities feel that the
juvenile has relinquished too many of his rights in exchange
for the promise of parens patriaetreatment. They believe that
the concept of "individualized justice" laid down by the
original juvenile court act of 1899 should be preserved, but
that some of the adult procedural safeguards should be incorporated into juvenile procedures. These authorities are
in sharp disagreement as to which safeguards should be incorporated and which should continue to be disregarded in
order to assure the perpetuation of the treatment process.
A recent Arizona case, In re Gault,4 considered on appeal
to the United States Supreme Court, examined the constitutionality of the juvenile court system. Specifically at issue
was whether a state by its juvenile code or statutes may
accord a juvenile less than all the due process guarantees
available in criminal proceedings. The resulting decision is
forcing a major revision of juvenile court procedures throughout the fifty states.
As there was no record of the trial proceedings in the juvenile court, the facts of the case had to be pieced together on
appeal. On June 8, 1964, Gerald Gault and a friend were
taken into custody pursuant to a call to the police by a
neighbor who had received a lewd telephone call. Gerald
was then on probation for a previous offense.5 No steps
were taken to advise Gerald's parents of his arrest, and
they first learned of it through a neighbor. When Mrs. Gault
went to the detention home where Gerald was held, a juvenile probation officer told her the reasons for the arrest
and said that a hearing would be held the following day.0
A petition was filed on the hearing date, but the petition was not seen by the Gaults prior to the trial court
hearing. It did not refer to any factual basis for the charges
it contained and alleged only that Gerald was a minor under
4 99 Ariz. 181, 407 P.2d 760 (1965), rev'd, 87 S. Ct. 1428 (1967).
87 S. Ct. at 1431-32.
6 Id. at 1432.
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the age of eighteen, delinquent and in need of the protection
of the court. It prayed for a hearing and an order regarding
7
his care and custody.
On the day of the hearing Gerald, his mother, older brother
and a probation officer appeared before the juvenile judge in
chambers. The complainant was absent. None of the participants was sworn. No transcript of the proceeding was prepared. From the memory of those present, Gerald's mother
recalled that Gerald said he only dialed the number and
handed the telephone to his friend; the officer recalled that
Gerald admitted making the indecent remarks; and the juvenile court judge remembered that Gerald admitted making
one of the lewd statements. No ruling was made and Gerald
was returned to the detention home. Two or three days
later he was released, no reason being given for the delay
8
in his release.
On the day of Gerald's release, Mrs. Gault received a note
signed by the probation officer informing her that Judge
McGhee of the juvenile court had set a further hearing for
June fifteenth. At that hearing Mrs. Gault asked that the
complainant be present in order to establish which boy had
done the talking. The judge said that complainant did not
have to be present at that hearing.9 At that hearing a probation officer's report was filed although not disclosed to
Gerald or his parents. At the conclusion of the hearing, the
judge committed Gerald as a juvenile delinquent to the state
industrial school by the customary order which comnitted
him for the period of his minority, until twenty-one, unless
sooner discharged by due process of law.10
7 Id.
8 Id.
0 Id. at 1433. The judge had never spoken to complainant and
the probation officer had talked to her only once over the
telephone on June ninth.
10 Id. This order is similar to those used throughout the
United States to commit a child to an industrial school,
training school or reformatory school until the rehabilitative staff of that school feels the juvenile is sufficiently reformed for release.
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Since no appeal is permitted by Arizona law in juvenile
cases, a writ of habeas corpus was filed with the Arizona
Supreme Court which referred the writ to the superior court
for hearing. At that hearing, Judge McGhee testified that
in arriving at his decision he had taken into account the
fact that Gerald was on probation. He testified that Gerald
came within the statutory definition of a delinquent." The
law which Gerald was found to have violated makes the
offense a misdemeanor, the adult penalty for which would
be a maximum fine of fifty dollars or imprisonment for two
12
months.
The superior court dismissed the writ and the Gaults
sought review in the Arizona Supreme Court. Appellants
assigned as error the unconstitutionality of the juvenile code l a
because it does not require that parents and children be appraised of the specific charges, does not require proper notice
of a hearing and does not provide for an appeal. It was alleged
further that the proceedings and order relating to Gerald
constituted a denial of due process of law because of the
absence of adequate notice of the charge and hearing; failure
to notify appellants of certain constitutional rights, including
the rights to counsel and to confrontation and the privilege
against self-incrimination; the use of unsworn hearsay testimony; and the failure to make a record of the proceedings. 14
In affirming the superior court order, the Arizona Supreme
Court held that advance notice of the specific charges or
1 Id. at 1433-34. See Amiz. R-EV. STAT. § 8-201 (6) (1956), which
provides: "'Delinquent Child' includes ... (a) a child who
has Violated a law of the state .... "
12 See Am. REV. STAT. § 13-337 (1956), which provides: "A
person who, in the . . .hearing of any woman . . . , uses
vulgar, abusive or obscene language, is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not.., more than fifty
dollars, or by imprisonment . . . for no more than two
months."
18 APTz. REV. STAT. § § 8-201 to -239 (1956).
14 n7 S. Ct. at 1434.
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basis for taking the juvenile into custody and for the hearing
is not necessary, 5 that the juvenile court has discretion to
allow representation of juveniles by an attorney and that due
process does not require that a child have right to counsel in
delinquency preceedings."
It further held that a juvenile
court judge is not required to advise the child in delinquency
proceedings of a privilege against self-incrimination; 1'7 that
hearsay testimony may be considered, but sworn testimony
must be required of all witnesses; 8 that there is no right to
an appeal from a juvenile court order; 19 and that the juvenile court has discretion to order or deny the taking of a
transcript.20 The United States Supreme Court found itself
in strong disagreement with these findings.
In their brief to the Supreme Court, appellants urged
that the Juvenile Code of Arizona be held invalid as being
contrary to the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. They argued that it allows a juvenile to be taken from
the custody of his parents and committed to a state institution pursuant to proceedings in which the juvenile court has
virtually unlimited discretion, and in which these basic rights
are denied: 1) notice of the charges; 2) right to counsel;
3) right to confrontation and cross-examination; 4) right to
a transcript of the proceedings; and 5) right to appellate
review.2'
NoTicE oF CHARGEs

Appellants urged that proceedings before the juvenile
court constituted a denial of constitutional rights because
of failure to provide adequate notice of the hearings. No
notice was given to Gerald's parents when he was taken
1r 407 P.2d at 767.

10 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 87

at 767-68.
at 768.
at 764.
at 768.
S. Ct. at 1434-35.
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into custody. The only written notice ever received by
Gerald's parents was the note from the probation officer
22
notifying them of the second hearing.
The Arizona Supreme Court had denied appellants' claim
that there was inadequate notice. That court stated that
"Mrs. Gault knew the exact nature of the charge against
Gerald from the day he was taken to the detention home."23
The Arizona court held that because "the policy of the
juvenile law is to hide youthful errors from the full gaze
of the public and bury them in the graveyard of the forgotten past,"24 due process did not require advance notice
of the basis for a juvenile's arrest. It held that "the infant
and his parent or guardian will receive a petition only
reciting a conclusion of delinquency. But no later than the
initial hearing by the judge, they must be advised of the
facts involved in the case. If the charges are denied, they
must be given a reasonable period of time to prepare." 25
Speaking for the majority, Mr. Justice Fortas said:
Notice, to comply with due process requirements, must
be given sufficiently in advance of scheduled court proceedings so that reasonable opportunity to prepare will
be afforded, and it must "set forth the alleged misconduct
with particularity." It is obvious.., that no purpose of
shielding the child from the public stigma of knowledge
of his having been taken into custody and scheduled for
hearing26is served by the procedure approved by the court
below.
Notice, therefore, to be sufficient to satisfy due process must
be in writing, stating the specific charges to be considered
at the hearing, and must be given sufficiently in advance
of the hearing to allow the child and his parents or guardian
time to prepare a defense.
22

Id. at 1445.

2
24

Id. at 767.

25
26

407 P.2d at 768.

Id.
87 S. Ct. at 1446 (footnote omitted).
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Appellants' second contention was that the hearings before the juvenile court were constitutionally defective because the court did not advise Gerald or his parents of their
right to counsel, the hearings were held in the absence of
counsel, and no express waiver of these rights was given by
27
the child or his parents.

The majority of cases on right to counsel in juvenile
court hold that a juvenile has neither the right to counsel
nor the right to be advised that he has such a right. The
theory behind this denial was expressed by the Supreme Court
of California in People v. Dotson.28 That court extolled the
virtues of the parens patriae philosophy and stated:
It is only when by such lack of representation of the
minor undue advantage is taken of him or he is otherwise accorded unfair treatment resulting in a deprivation
of his rights that
it can be said he has been denied due
29
process of law.
The two leading cases in favor of right to counsel in
juvenile courts are In re Poff3 0 and Shioutakon v. District of
Columbia.31 In the Poll case, the district judge held that a
juvenile's right to counsel was grounded in due process. The
judge agreed that juvenile proceedings were aimed at providing the care and guidance normally furnished by parents,
but stated:
[W]here the child commits an act, which act if committed by an adult would constitute a crime, then due
process in the Juvenile Court requires that the child be
advised that he is entitled to the effective assistance of
counsel, and this is so even though the Juvenile Court in
27
28

Id. at 1447.
46 Cal. 891, 299 P.2d 875 (1956).

29 299 P.2d at 877.
30 135 F. Supp. 224 (D.D.C. 1955).

31 236 F.2d 666 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
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making dispositions
of delinquent children, is not a crim32
inal court.
The court in Shioutakon not only concluded that the juvenile
had a right to counsel but also a right to be advised of his
33
right to counsel.
In resolving the controversy over right to counsel in juvenile court, the Supreme Court stated:
A proceeding where the issue is whether the child will
be found "delinquent" and subjected to the loss of his
liberty for years is comparable in seriousness to a felony
prosecution. The juvenile needs the assistance of counsel to cope with problems of law, to make skilled inquiry
into the facts, to insist upon regularity of proceedings,
and to ascertain whether he has a defense and to prepare
and submit it. The child "requires the guiding hand of
counsel at every step in the proceeding against him.13 4
The Court stated that there has been an increasing recognition of this view and that in at least one-third of the state
statutes there is a guarantee of the right to be represented
by counsel, to be advised of the right, or to have a public
defender assigned in juvenile court proceedings. The Court
further noted that the President's Crime Commission had
recently recommended that counsel be appointed wherever
coercive action is expected. 35
32

135 F. Supp. at 227; accord, Shioutakon v. District of Columbia, 236 F.2d 666, (D.C. Cir. 1965) ("[tlhat there is a
need for such representation to protect the child's interests
is apparent ...

. Clearly a child cannot, without the aid

of counsel, competently decide whether he should exercise
this right.")

33
8

236 F.2d at 670.
87 S. Ct. at 1448 (footnotes omitted).

85 Id. at 1449. In further support of its position, the Court
quoted W. Sheridan, STANDARDS FOR JUVENLE AND FAmLY
COURTS; PREPARED IN COOPERATION WITH THE NATIONAL
CoUNCIL ON CRImE Aim DELINQUENCY. NATIONAL CouNcIL OF
JUVENME COURT JUDGES 57 (1966): "As a component part

of a fair hearing required by due process guaranteed under
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The Court concluded that, although Mrs. Gault testified
at the habeas corpus hearing that she knew she could have
appeared with counsel at the juvenile hearing, this knowledge
was not a waiver of the right to counsel. Both she and Gerald
had a right to be expressly advised that they might retain
counsel and to have discussed with them whether they did
or did not choose to waive the right; and, if they were unable
to employ counsel, they were entitled to appointed counsel
unless they chose waiver. Mrs. Gault's knowledge that she
could employ counsel was not an intentional relinquishment
of the right. 30 Mr. Justice Fortas, speaking for the majority,
stated:
[T]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that in respect of proceedings to determine
delinquency which may result in commitment to an
institution in which the juvenile's freedom is curtailed,
the child and his parents must be notified of the child's
right to be represented by counsel retained by them,
or if they are unable to afford counsel,37 that counsel will
be appointed to represent the child.
PRIVILEGE AGAINST

SELF-INcRIVNATION, RIGHT TO

CONFRONTATION AND CROSS-EXAMIINATION OF WITNESSES

Appellants urged that the writ of habeas corpus should
have been granted because the privilege against self-incrimination was not observed and because the rights of confrontation and cross-examination in the juvenile court hearings were
denied. 8
The leading case concerning a juvenile's privilege against
self-incrimination was People v. Lewis,3 9 in which a judg-

the 14th amendment, notice of the right to counsel should
be required at all hearings and counsel provided upon
request when the family is financially unable to employ
counsel."
36 87 S. Ct. at 1451.
37 Id.
88 Id. at 1451-52.

39 260 N.Y. 171, 183 N.E. 353 (1932), overruled, In re W., 19
N.Y.2d 55, 277 N.Y.S.2d 675, 225 N.E.2d 102 (1966).
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ment of delinquency and a commitment to a state industrial
school were based solely upon the confession of a fifteenyear-old child who was not advised of his right against selfincrimination. The Court of Appeals of New York affirmed
the juvenile court, holding that, since it was not a criminal
proceeding, there was neither the right to nor the necessity
for the procedural safeguards prescribed by the constitution
and statutes for criminal cases. Thus, there was no privilege
against self-incrimination.40
In ruling on the Gault case, the Arizona Supreme Court
stated:
We think the necessary flexibility for individualized
treatment will be enhanced by a rule which does not
require the judge to advise the infant of a privilege
against self-incrimination.41
Reviewing the lower court proceedings, the Supreme Court
determined that there was conflict and uncertainty among
the witnesses at the habeas corpus proceeding. The juvenile
judge, the probation officer and Mr. and Mrs. Gault disagreed
as to what Gerald did or did not admit. 42 "Neither Gerald
nor his parents was advised that he did not have to testify
or make a statement, or that an incriminating statement might
40

A finding of delinquency based upon admissions by a child
in the course of juvenile proceedings has been upheld in
numerous instances. See In re Dargo, 81 Cal. App. 2d 205,
183 P.2d 282 (1947); State v. Cronin, 220 La. 233, 56 So. 2d
242 (1951); In re Broughton, 192 Mich. 418, 158 N.W. 884
(1916); In re Santillanes, 47 N.M. 140, 138 P.2d 503 (1943);
In re Holmes, 379 Pa. 599, 109 A.2d 523 (1954). Contra,
Hampton v. State, 167 Ala. 73, 52 So. 659 (1910); Ex parte
Tahbel, 46 Cal. App. 755, 189 P. 804 (1920); State v. Ireland,
81 Mont. 144, 262 P. 172 (1927); State v. Hutton, 81 Mont.
143, 262 P. 172 (1927); State v. Freeman, 81 Mont. 132,
262 P. 168 (1927); People v. Fitzgerald, 244 N.Y. 307, 155
N.E. 584 (1927); Dendy v. Wilson, 142 Tex. 460, 179 S.W.2d
296 (1944).

41 407 P.2d at 767-68.
42

87 S. Ct. at 1452.
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result in his commitment .... ,,43 The primary evidentiary
basis for his commitment was his admission. Soundly rejecting the Arizona Supreme Court's ruling on the privilege
against self-incrimination, the Court stated:
It would indeed be surprising if the privilege against
self-incrimination were available to hardened criminals
but not to children. The language of the Fifth Amendment, applicable to the States by operation of the Fourteenth Amendment, is unequivocal and without exception. And the scope of the privilege is comprehensive. 44
The Court seemed greatly influenced by the recent New
York Family Court Act which provides that the juvenile and
his parents must be advised at the start of the hearings of
his right to remain silent. The New York Act also requires
that police must attempt to communicate with the juvenile's
parents before questioning him.45 The Court noted that in In re

W.,46 the New York Court of Appeals held that the privilege

against self-incrimination was applicable to juveniles and required the exclusion of involuntary confessions. That court
said that the holding in People v. Lewis4 7 was no longer
48
authority, specifically having been overruled by statute.

The Supreme Court concluded that:
[C]ommitment is a deprivation of liberty. It is incarceration against one's will, whether it is called "criminal"
or "civil." And our Constitution guarantees that no person shall be "compelled" to be witness against himself
when he is threatened with deprivation of his libertya command which this Court has broadly applied and
generously implemented in accordance with the teaching
of the history of the privilege and its great office in mankind's battle for freedom.49
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 N
N.

at 1454.

Y. FAMILY COURT ACT § 741 (McKinney 1963).
46 19 N.Y.2d 55, 277 N.Y.S.2d 675, 224 N.E.2d 102 (1966).
47
48

49

260 N.Y. 171, 183 N.E. 353 (1932).

19 N.Y.2d at 62, 277 N.Y.S.2d at 680, 224 N.E.2d at 106.
87 S. Ct. at 1455-56.
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The Court had been urged to take the position "that the
juvenile . . . should not be advised of [his] right to silence
because confession is good for the child [and part] of the
assumed therapy of the juvenile court process, and he should
be encouraged to assume an attitude of trust and confidence
toward the officials of the juvenile process."50 The Court
rejected this position stating that recent evidence pointed to
the fact that confessions by juveniles did not aid in furthering
their treatment and that, "where children are induced to
confess by 'paternal' urgings on the part of officials and the
confession is followed by disciplinary action, the child's reaction is likely to be hostile and adverse-the child may
well feel that he has been led or tricked into confession and
that despite his confession, he is being punished. 5 1
The Court dealt with the issues of confrontation and
cross-examination only briefly. However, the justices made
it clear that they were disturbed by the fact that the juvenile court had committed Gerald on little evidence other than
his own admissions. They pointed out that there was nothing
apart from Gerald's own statement upon which a judgment
of delinquency could be based. There was no sworn testimony and Gerald did not receive the opportunity to confront
the complainant. Commenting on the Arizona Supreme
Court's requirement of sworn testimony only from those officially related to the juvenile court, the Supreme Court
stated that in the absence of a valid confession, received only
after proper advice to the juvenile of his rights, that confrontation and sworn testimony by witnesses present before
the accused with an opportunity for cross-examination must
be available in order to support a judgment of delinquency.5 2
The Court thus reiterated the position it had taken in the
53
leading case of Kent v. United States.
50 Id. at 1456.
51 Id. (footnotes omitted).
52

Id. at 1459.

i3 383 U.S. 541 (1966). Due to the severity of the offense, the
juvenile court waived its right to try the youth as a juve-
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APPELLATE REvIEw AND
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
Appellants urged that the Arizona statute was unconstitutional under the due process clause because it gave no
right to an appeal from a juvenile court order. The Arizona
Supreme Court had ruled that there was no right to an
appeal, and, concomitantly no right to a transcript of proceedings since its purpose was urged to be for the taking of
54
an appeal.
Unlike the constitutional guarantees in the Bill of Rights,
such as the right to counsel and the privilege against selfincrimination, the right of appeal is not a "right" in the constitutional sense. The Supreme Court has held that denial of
appeal in a state criminal case does not offend the Constitution. 55
There are numerous state court decisions holding
that the right to a review of juvenile court proceedings is
not essential to due process of law but is a matter of legislative
grace. 6
The Supreme Court again declined to rule that an appeal
was guaranteed by the Constitution, stating:
In view of the fact that we must reverse the Supreme
Court of Arizona's affirmance of the dismissal of the writ
of habeas corpus for other reasons, we need not rule on
this question in the present case or upon the failure to
provide a transcript or recording of the hearings--or,
indeed, the failure of the juvenile
court judge to state the
57
grounds for his conclusion.
nile and the juvenile was tried in an adult court to assure
procedural protection. The court stated: "[T]here is no
place in our system of law for reaching a result of such
tremendous consequences without ceremony.... ." Id. at 554.
' 87 S. Ct. at 1459.
''See, e.g., Kohl v. Lehlback, 160 U.S. 293 (1895).
56 See, e.g., Wissenberg v. Bradley, 209 Iowa 813, 229 N.W. 205
(1929); In re Santillanes, 47 N.M. 140, 138 P.2d 503 (1943).
See also 31 Am. Jum. Juvenile Courts §§ 87, 90 (1958).
07 87 S. Ct. at 1460.
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The Court did point out, however, that failure to provide
for an appeal, failure to transcribe proceedings, and failure
to state grounds for decision in juvenile court places a heavy
burden upon a court when a juvenile seeks to obtain review
in a subsequent habeas corpus proceeding.58
MOTIVATING FACTORS

With the majority of state statutes and decisions supporting the informal process in the juvenile courts, 9 the question
arises as to why the Supreme Court, through the Gault decision, reversed sixty-eight years of tradition and formalized
juvenile court procedures. In 1965, persons under eighteen
accounted for about one-fifth of all arrests for serious crimes,10
and over one-half of all arrests for serious property offenses.01
In the same year 601,000 children under eighteen, or two
percent of the total population of that age, came before juvenile courts. 62 About one out of nine youths will be referred
to a juvenile court in connection with a delinquent act, other
than a traffic offense, before he is eighteen.0 Self-report
studies reveal that perhaps ninety percent of all young people
have committed at least one act for which they could have
been brought to juvenile court.64
The Court appeared greatly influenced by the National
Crime Commission Report and other studies. In commenting
on these studies, the Court said:
It is claimed that juveniles obtain benefits from
58 Id.

59 See Pee v. United States, 274 F.2d 556, 561 (D.C. Cir. 1959)
(Appendix "A").
60

PRESIENT'S CoIVImIsSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIUiE IN FREE
SOCIETY 55 (1967).

61 Id. at 56.
COURT STATISTICS - 1965, CHILDREN'S BUREAU STATISTICAL SERIES, No. 85, at 2 (1966).
SPREsIDENT's CoilvmssIoN ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND AD-

62 JUVENILE

6

MINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, supra note 60.
PREsIDENT'S CoMMIssION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT
MnISTRATION OF JUSTICE, supra note 60.
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the special procedures applicable to them which more
than offset the disadvantages of denial of the substance
of normal due process .... [T]he observance of due process standards, intelligently and not ruthlessly administered, will not compel the States to abandon or displace any of the substantive benefits of the juvenile
process. But it is important, we think, that the claimed
benefits of the juvenile process should be candidly appraised. Neither sentiment nor folklore should cause
us to shut our eyes, for example, to such startling findings as that reported in an exceptionally reliable study
of repeaters or recidivision conducted by the Stanford
Research Institute for the President's Commission on
Crime in the District of Columbia. The Commission's
Report states: "In fiscal 1966 approximately 66 percent
of the 16-and 17-year-old juveniles referred to the court
by the Youth Aid Division had been before the court
previously. In 1965, 56 percent of those in the Receiving
Home were repeaters. The SRI Study revealed that
61 percent of the sample Juvenile Court referrals in
1965 had been previously referred at least once and
that 42 percent had been referred at least twice be00
fore."6
The Court pointed out that one could hardly conclude from
the above figures that the absence of constitutional safeguards in the juvenile process was effective to reduce crime
or rehabilitate offenders. It believed that features of the
juvenile system, considered to be of unique benefit, could
yet be preserved alongside procedural safeguards. The Court
emphasized that the decision to require constitutional adherence in the proceeding did not affect the valuable treatment of juveniles separate from adults following adjudication; thus present rehabilitative programs were not affected.
It was further pointed out that the "criminal stigma" need
not be applied as a result of these charges. Likewise, state
statutes providing that "adjudication of the child as a delinquent shall not operate as a civil disability, or disqualify

65 87 S. Ct. at 1441 (Court's footnotes omitted).
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him from civil service appointment" are not affected by the
application of due process requirements. 66
Thus, the Supreme Court has taken the position that
the guarantee of fairness, impartiality and orderliness, the
essentials of due process, may be a more therapeutic attitude so far as the juvenile is concerned.
CONCLUSION

The effects of the Gault decision are becoming highly
noticeable in the juvenile courts of our land. Courts in some
states, reluctant to give up the informal process, are increasing their unofficial handling of children in order to maintain
informality. Courts may attempt to preserve informality
by the use of a written form whereby the parent consents
to accept help for the child from a court probation counselor who holds "unofficial" conferences with the child, thus
deferring the necessity for a formal hearing. In such a procedure, a question may arise as to whether waiver by the
parents is effective to waive the rights of the child. It may
be in the child's best interest that he be provided a formal
hearing with all the guarantees of the Gault decision.
A remaining gray area is the question of whether a child
must have an attorney in juvenile proceedings. The Gault
decision states only that the right to be notified expressly
of right to counsel is guaranteed and, if counsel is denied,
the right to have one appointed if the child is from an
indigent family is further guaranteed. The President's Crime
Commission Report, quoted in the Gault decision, recommends
that an attorney "be appointed as a matter of course wherever
coercive action is a possibility, without requiring any affirmative choice by child or parent."6 7 Recent interviews with
juvenile court judges indicate that many are interpreting the
Court's mandate as requiring that the child must have an
attorney where his incarceration is a possibility. As a result,
66 Id. at 1441-42.
67 PRESIET'S CoMIvnssIoN ON LAW ENFORCEMENT
-IINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, supra note 60, at 85.

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol5/iss1/4

AND

AD-

16

Snavely: In Re Gault--Supreme Court Formalizes Juvenile Court Procedures
19681

IN RE GAULT

some are providing a public defender. 68 Certainly, provision
for guaranteed representation through a public defender
should provide effective protection to the juvenile and avoid
a possible reversal on this ground.
A further question left unanswered is whether a minor
can waive his right to counsel or must this be allowed only
if the parents agree. In the Gault case the court shed some
light on a possible answer when it stated: "They [Gerald and
his parents] had a right expressly to be advised that they
might retain counsel and to be confronted with the need for
specific consideration of whether they did or did not choose
to waive the right."6 9 The language used by the Court raises
an inference that waiver requires the joint agreement of both
parent and child. On the other hand, a leading case on this
issue, McBride v. Jacobs,7 indicates that the juvenile alone
may effect a waiver. The court in McBride held that, where a
waiver of right to counsel is relied upon, the juvenile court must
affirmatively find as a fact that by reason of "age, education,
and information, and all other pertinent facts," the minor is
able to and did make an intelligent waiver; but where the
Court finds for any reason that the alleged juvenile offender
is not capable of waiver of right to counsel, the parent may
waive, provided the court finds no conflict of interest between the juvenile and his parent."1
The Court's decision in Gault left unsettled the question
of police procedures with juveniles. In regard to adults it
is now held that the right to be advised of right to counsel
and the right against self-incrimination are guaranteed from
the time of arrest and thereafter. 2 From the language in
The Juvenile Court of Tulsa County, Oklahoma, has recently acquired a public defender in accordance with this
theory.
'987 S. Ct. at 1451.
70 247 F.2d 595 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
71Id. at 596.
72 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Escobedo v.
Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
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Gault, a similar conclusion may be drawn with regard to
juveniles. The Court in Gault has said that "the Fifth Amendment, applicable to the states by operation of the Fourteenth
Amendment, is unequivocal and without exception [applicable
to juveniles]."7 3 The Escobedo v. Illinois 4 and Miranda v.
ArizonaT5 decisions guarantee an adult, at the moment
he is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom in any significant way, that he must be advised
of his right to silence; he must be advised that any statement
he makes may be used as evidence against him; and he must
be advised that he has a right to the presence of an attorney
either retained or appointed at any stage of an interrogation
by law enforcement officers. The decisions in the Escobedo
and Miranda cases were drawn from an interpretation of the
fifth amendment. By a parity of reasoning, if Gault has endowed juveniles with all of the rights of the fifth amendment,
then the guarantees of Escobedo and Miranda are available
to juveniles from the moment they are taken into custody.
Progressive police and court probation departments, with eyes
toward prevention of future difficulties concerning these
rights, should perhaps take the position that the court has
implied that juveniles must be advised of these rights at
the time of arrest and thereafter.
Perhaps the most compelling issue which the Court did
not resolve is the question of desirability of present indeterminate sentences for juveniles. The Court avowed its
concern that Gerald Gault could be confined for a period up
to six years for an offense that drew only a maximum adult
penalty of two months. However, the Court left the question
of the confinement period undecided as that question was
not before it. 76

Some reformists may attempt to limit sen-

tences for juveniles in the same manner as they are limited
73

87 S. Ct. at 1454.

7 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
75
76

384 U.S. 436 (1966).
87 S.Ct. at 1444.
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for adults. In such an attempt, however, two important
factors should be considered. First, it should be remembered
that juveniles accumulate a record with the juvenile court
while on probation, and it is this accumulation or history of
delinquency for which they are committed rather than for
any single act. Second, the usual effect of the juvenile court
commitment is not incarceration until majority or age twentyone, but rather commitment for a period of about nine
77
months.
The Gault decision has ended the parens patriae doctrine
in all juvenile procedures except final disposition after adjudication. In doing so, a wonderful ideal which has endured
for three-quarters of a century disappears from the American
scene. Many who feel they have acted in behalf of the child
with caution, objectivity and concern for his rights will
not relinquish the doctrine easily. Mr. Justice Stewart who
registered the single dissent to the Gault opinion is doubtless
one of these persons. The majority, however, felt that too
much damage was being rendered children by misguided good
intentions, and thus the ideal of the parenspatriae could never
be achieved.
Even so, there is still room for individualized rehabilitative treatment following adjudication, and the new safeguards
should strengthen the decisions of our juvenile courts.
John T. Snavely*
7 NATIONAL CoUNcm ON CRIME AmD DELINQUENCY, PRESIDENT'S

ConvzissioN ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, CORRECTION IN THE UNITED STATES 80 (1967). This
report states: "The length of stay for children committed
to state training facilities ranges from 4 to 24 months; the
median length of stay is nine months ....
[T]hree-fourths
of the total, housing nine-tenths of the institutional population - have an average length of stay of six months to a
year."
*Alfr. Snavely is Supervisor of Juvenile Aftercare Services
for the Division of State Homes and Schools, Oklahoma Department of Public Welfare, at its Tulsa office.
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